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Federal Employee Labor Relations:
From The "Gag Rule" To
Executive Order 11491
STUART M. RosENBLum *
SHELTON E. STEmIBACH*
"A government which imposed upon private employers certain
obligations in dealing with their employees may not in good
faith refuse to deal with its own public servants on a reasonably
similar basis, modified of course to meet the exigencies of public
service."
-American Bar Association, "Second Report
of the Committee on Labor Relations of
Governmental Employees," 125, (1955).
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEE LABOR UNIONS
The United States government is the single largest employer
in this country. No private enterprise can even approach the
vast number of people employed by our federal government.
Yet, this great work-force is not always free to join private labor
unions, and it is not afforded the same protection and voice in
determining wages, hours, and working conditions as are their
brothers in private employment. However, progress is being
made and unionization of federal employees has become a factor
of increasing importance in the determination of the conditions
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KENTucKY LAW JouN[o5AL
of public employment.' In order to better understand the special
problems of federal employee unionism, this article will outline
the history of labor organizations among federal employees.
With this view of prior governmental experience in the utiliza-
tion of sometime paternalistic, and unilateral methods of de-
veloping personnel policies and managing working conditions,
the modern administrator can better understand the present
frustration, excessive militancy, and desires of public employees,
whose main hopes lie in the bilateral determination of wages,
hours, and conditions of employment through their chosen rep-
resentatives.
A. Early History of Federal Employee Labor Union
During the early part of the nineteenth century a number
of social and benevolent societies of federal employees existed.
However, by virtue of their form and function, they could not
properly be classified as unions, as they did not function as
groups to carry on collective bargaining with management.
Some unions began to emerge in the 1830's when workers
in activities such as arsenals, navy yards, and printing offices
combined to form craft unions.2 Initial collective efforts were
centered around establishing a ten-hour work day in all federal
works, a standard which was implemented by President Van
Buren in 1840.3 With the federal government taking the lead,
employee organizations started to exert pressure for an eight-
hour day, which was established in part in 1842, by administrative
action and was enacted into law in 1868 for the aforementioned
crafts.
With the Great Panic of 1873, the trade union movement,
insofar as government employees were concerned, went into a
' The Civil Service Commission publication, UNION RECOGNITION IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, November, 1969 and November, 1970 reveals that in
November, 1970 there were 1,542,111 federal employees covered by exclusive
recognition, a 4% gain over the preceding year and representing 58% of the
employees in the executive branch, excluding the FBI, CIA, NSA and foreign
nations serving outside the United States. For initial developments see, Wallerstein
Labor Relations in Public Employment-The Federal Experience, 19 PnocEEDncs
N.Y.U. ANNUAL CONFEBENcE ON LABOR 205,211 (1967) and W. VOSLOO,
COLLECtivE BAnGAINING IN =m U.S. FEDERAL CIvi SEvicE 112-25 (1966).
2 See for greater detail Jacoby, Collective Bargaining for Federal Employees,
18 N.Y.U. INTPA. L. REv. 287 (1963).
a For a detailed account of this period see S. SPaO, GovERNmENT AS Em-
PLOYER Ch. 5 (2d ed. 1948).
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decline, and did not become active again until near the end
of the century. However, in the 1880's, true unionism began to
reappear with the organization of postal employees into craft
unions of letter carriers, rural carriers, post office clerks, railway
mail clerks, and others.4 Trade unionism had not become a
matter of concern to post office employees until the passage of
the Civil Service Act of 1883. Prior to that time the post office
service was totally political in nature, with security and advance-
ment dependent upon the favors of the political machine. Often
a change in political control involved an entire change in post
office personnel from the postmaster to the lowest employee.
With the passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883, most post office
positions were placed under the merit system. This change
precipitated a concurrent decline in congressional interest in
these positions because of their unavailability as party spoils.5
The lack of congressional concern, in turn, was primarily re-
sponsible for failure of the government to improve working con-
ditions, and this failure laid the foundation for the development
of postal employee unions.
The letter carriers joined with the Knights of Labor to win
an eight-hour day in 1888. The Post Office Department manage-
ment employed every means at its disposal to disrupt the organiza-
tion, forcing much of the employee leadership to go underground.
The Post Office Department's opposition to employee or-
ganizations took several forms. In 1895 the Postmaster General
forbade postal workers from coming to Washington for the
"purpose of influencing legislation before Congress." Although
never effectively enforced, the rule became a weapon that could
be used against an employee that had incurred the Depart-
ment's wrath. This rule was seemingly forgotten during the
Congressional session of 1901-02, when a unified effort was made
by employees to seek higher wages.
The National Association of Letter Carriers was formed in
1890, about the time that the Knights were diminishing in
power. The same year, the National Association of Post Office
Clerks was formed in which minor supervisory officials were
4 The full story is recorded in S. SPEao, THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN A GoV-
EBNmENT INDUsTRY (1924). See also H. KAPLAN, THE LAW OF CrvIL SERVICE 18
(1958).
rH. KAPLAN, Tim LAW OF CIVIL SERVICE 58-63 (1958).
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allowed membership; however, anyone above the grade of fore-
man was excluded. 6 At the heart of the problem for the postal
associations was the conflict over whether to establish them-
selves as independent functioning bodies, free from the control
of postal authorities, or to try to achieve their respective program
objectives through gaining the cooperation of the Department.
Outside of the postal services only a few, primarily local
unions of public employees had been organized prior to the start
of the twentieth century. Employees at this time possessed
little community of interest.7  Thus, administrative opposition
and lack of employee cohesion impeded the development of
employee organizations.
President Theodore Roosevelt responded by his now famous
"gag order" of January 31, 1902, s forbidding federal employees,
under penalty of dismissal, from seeking legislation on their be-
half except through the department in which they were employed.
The Order, however, did not prevent employees from approach-
ing friendly legislators in private,9 and President Taft supple-
mented the "gag order" in November, 1909, to prohibit federal
employees from even responding to congressional requests for
information. 10
In 1906, the American Federation of Labor granted a charter
to the National Federation of Post Office Clerks making it the
first national labor organization composed exclusively of gov-
ernment employees to affiliate with the labor movement. The
A.F. of L. immediately began to demand the restoration of
civil rights of federal employees and the alleviation of unfavor-
able working conditions and inadequate pay. Their efforts, how-
ever, made little impression on the administration.
6 Id. at 66-70.
7 See, V. iPER, HIsTORY or THE UNITED STATES CIvI. SERvicE 274 (1958).
8 The Roosevelt Executive Order stated:
All officers and employees of the United States of every description,
serving in or under any of the Executive Departments, and whether so
serving in or out of work are hereby forbidden either directly or in-
directly, individually, or through associations, to solicit an increase of
pay or to influence or attempt to influence in their own any other legis-
lation whatever, either before Congress or its Committees, or in any
way save through the heads of Departments in or under which they
serve on penalty of dismissal from the Government Service.
9 SSmEo n. 3 supra. The "gag rule" over time also caused severe unrest,
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Dissatisfaction grew even greater with the "take-up-slack
order" in 1910, which reduced crews, left positions vacant, re-
duced time off, and produced a massive pile of undelivered mail.-"
Work stoppages occurred because of the conditions outlined, the
interrogation of union members by the Post Office Department,
and the demotion and discharge of leaders. It is also clear that
the department heads failed to present the workers' case fairly
before Congress. All these events culminated in an independent
investigation conducted by Senator Robert La Follette, who
sent questionnaires to every railway postal clerk, the responses
to which ultimately contributed to enactment of the Lloyd-La
Follette Act of 1912.12
The Lloyd-La Follette Act sought to nullify the "gag order,"
stop postal authorities from interfering with the organization of
postal workers, and guarantee the right of employee association.
The Act guaranteed the right of federal employees to petition
Congress on their own behalf, forbade the removal or demotion
of an employee for union activities, and gave him the right to
be confronted with a written set of charges along with an op-
portunity to answer those charges before being dismissed. The
Act was interpreted as an expression of congressional sentiment
favoring the right of government workers to organize.' 3
Unfortunately, some abuses continued even under the new
legislation. An economy emphasis during World War I influenced
administrators to require their employees to work before hours
and on Sundays, and to oust those who presented any problems
"for the efficiency of the service."
The legislation proved to be less of a panacea than its spon-
sors had hoped it would be. It became difficult to prove that
disciplinary action was principally motivated by an employee's
union activity, and judicial interpretation further emasculated
the statute. Reformers had presumed that public employees who
were removed or reduced in rank or compensation for union
activity would be able to obtain a court order directing their
11 Id. at 139-40.
1237 Stat. 555 (1912). Kaplan notes that during the Taft administration an
increase in hours and a decrease in wages accompanied by unsafe and unsanitary
working conditions was brought to public attention through a small paper started
by a former postal employee. Its circulation led to an investigation by Senator
La Follette and the Lloyd-La Follette Act. Supra n. 5, at 19.
18 See n.8 supra at 18.
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restoration. However, the courts declined to look behind the
administrative record for the real motivation behind a removal
or reduction in rank or compensation, and proceeded to sustain
the administrative action taken so *long as procedural require-
ments were complied with and the charges were sufficient on
their face to support the action taken. The courts held that
there was no jurisdiction in the Federal District Courts, other
than that of the District of Columbia, to maintain a reinstate-
ment action and that to inquire into the underlying motivations
of administrative officials who were acting under a valid delega-
tion of authority would be an unwarranted interference with
administrative authority and discretion.1
4
The federal service has been an open shop since 1903, when
President Roosevelt ordered the reinstatement of W. A. Miller,
who had been dismissed from his job at the Government Printing
Office because of his expulsion from the local Bookbinders
Union. 5 In actuality, however, the particular shop in question
had been and remained a union shop; all new employees became
union members in their own particular trade under the pressure
of social ostracism. On the other hand, it is still generally felt
that the union shop is incompatible with the principles applicable
to government employment in that a man should have the right
to work for his government without having to join a union. 6
The next surge in union interest occurred around 1916, as a
result of Kansas Representative William Borland's proposal that
minimum daily work hours of government employees in Wash-
ington be increased from seven to eight. The response of workers
was unexpected; The A.F. of L. protested vigorously, and em-
ployees of the Quartermaster General Office in the War Depart-
ment took steps to form a union. Within days, thousands had
14 Levine v. Farley, 107 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 808 U.S.
622 (1940).
155S SPERo, TE LAnon MovErMMT IN A GovERNmwT ImusTmY 52 (1924).
16 See note 5 supra, at 831 where Kaplan states:
The characteristics of government employment are uniquely such that
neither the 'close shop' or 'union shop' may assume a proper place in
government service. Such practices would be held to violate the demo-
cratic concept that every citizen may have the privilege of aspiring to
public office, if he is qualified to such responsibility and he may not be
arbitrarily discriminated against in appointment, promotion or retention
in the service. There is no warrent for preferentially favoring members
of a labor union for public places. Such restriction would be as invalid
as discrimination based on political affiliation, religious belief, race or
creed.
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signed up and had helped to lobby to defeat the Borland Bill.
The outgrowth of this incident was the creation of the National
Federation of Federal Employees (hereinafter N.F.F.E.), which
was given a broad charter by the A.F. of L. covering almost all
government employees except those in the Post Office. Among
innovations by the N.F.F.E. was a scientific and technical section,
one of the earliest attempts to organize workers in these cate-
gories. The union sought to obtain its objectives by evoking
sentiment favorable to proposed reforms and by cooperation with
the government officials. The N.F.F.E. constitution specifically
renounced its right to strike. The union increased from 10,000
members in October, 1917 to 50,000 in June, 1919.17
In the years following the end of World War I, resistance to
national affiliation with the A.F. of L. emerged. Many influential
individuals equated government employees with soldiers and
felt that unionization was incompatible with public service.
Others feared that A.F. of L. membership and government service
presented a conflict of interest and that public employees would
be unable to perform their duties faithfully and in an impartial
manner. The general attitude was that trade unionism smacks
of disloyalty.18 The unions were able to mobilize some support
during this period through publicity and lobbying with individual
Congressmen. They further gained support by successfully out-
lawing strikes. However, the unions won little in the Classifica-
tion Act of 1923 as they merely received their old wage level
plus the World War I bonuses. However, the N.F.F.E. did fare
better in 1928, when the Welch Act was passed, increasing rates
of pay.
19
The thirties saw a split develop between N.F.F.E. and A.F.
17 See n. 7 supra, at 274-75.
18 For an elaboration of this line of reasoning as it involves both state and
federal employees see Steinbach, Public Employee Organization: A Constitution-
ally Protected Right? 15 S.D. L. Bxv. 285 (1970).
19 Welch Act, 1950, ch. 814, 45 Stat. 776. The tone of the times can be seen
from the following excerpt from a campaign speech by President Herbert Hoover
in 1928:
The government by stringent civil service rules must debar its em-
ployees from their full political rights as free men. It must limit them in
their liberty to bargain for their own wages for no government employee
can strike aginst his government and thus against the whole people.
It makes a legislative body, with all its political currents, their final
employer and master. Their bargaining does not rest upon economic need
or economic strength but on political potence. See, SPEao, GovER m.r
As EMPLOYE 8 (2d ed. 1948).
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of L. on jurisdictional grounds.20 Besides the suffering caused by
the depression, union members began to question the broad
charter given to the N.F.F.E. Many felt that the union was
expanding from a craft to an industrial union. Thus, when the
Personnel Classification Board's report in 1931 included the
crafts in the classification system, A.F. of L. leaders decided
that N.F.F.E. was planning to destroy the principle of craft
unionism. The N.F.F.E. considered the Board's report the major
breakthrough which was essential for the betterment of public
employee conditions. After much convention bickering and
attempts at conciliation, the N.F.F.E. voted to leave the A.F. of L.
In response the A.F. of L., disregarding one of its cardinal
principles of not establishing another union to compete with
one in existence, broke with tradition and committed the crime
of "dualism" by creating the American Federation of Govern-
ment Employees (hereinafter A.F.G.E.).21
With the depression there was an influx into the civil service
of thousands who for the most part had left private industrial or-
ganizations and brought with them into the government service
the practices and traditions of private enterprise.22 Many of these
individuals, upon entering the government service, promptly
joined the A.F.G.E., even though the union was more con-
servative than they were as individuals. An economy drive in
1937 split the A.F.G.E. into two groups: those who wished to
2 0 The climate failed to change much insofar as government employees
were concerned. The Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1935), granting
bargaining rights to employees in private enterprise, excluded all government
employees from coverage. One can ascertain the mood of President Franklin
Roosevelt in the following often quoted letter from him to the president of the
National Federation of Federal Employees.All governme t employees shoud realize that the process of collective
bargaining, as usual y understood, cannot be tranlsplanted into the public
service. It has its distinct and unsurmountable limitations when appliedto public per onnel ma agement. The very nature and purpos s of Gov-
ernment make it impossible for administrative officials to represent fully
or to bend the employer in mutual discussions with government employee
organizations. The employer is the whole people who speak by means
of laws enacted by their rep resentatives in Congress. Accordingly, ad-
ministrative officials and employees alike governed and guided, once
in many instances restricted by laws which establish policies, procedures,
or rules in personnel matters, noted in City of Springfield v. Clouse,
206 S.W.2d 539,542 (1947).
21 By December, 1970, AFGE represented 530,550 employees in 1,300 units.
U.S. Cxvit SERvicE ComnssioN, UNIoN RLcotrrroN iN THE FimDtAL Govxmn-
m-rmT [hereinafter UNoN REcocNmoN] (1970). On the earlier period see VAN
RIwE, HIsToRY or TEE UNrran STATEs CrviL SERvicE 348-49 (1958).
22 See n.5 supra at 317.
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continue the more customary publicity and lobbying tactics in
Congress and those who wished to use more militant methods.
The larger group was expelled, and it later formed the nucleus
of the C.I.O.'s United Federal Workers of America (hereinafter
U.F.W.A.).2 3 The U.F.W.A. instituted the practice of presenting
information to the Bureau of the Budget and of publicizing its
grievance procedure. The N.F.F.E. continued in its traditional
way characterized by a more conservative professional tone. 4
World War II saw the union movement maintain much of
the same form. Following the war, the U.F.W.A. and the State,
County and Municipal Workers of America (S.C.M.W.A.), both
C.I.O. unions, merged, under the name United Public Workers
of America (hereinafter UPW), which claimed a total member-
ship of 108,000. The UPW adopted a pro-Soviet stance, and its
membership fell rapidly.25 By 1950 the UPW was ousted from
the C.I.O. for its alleged communist domination and is presently
defunct.
Despite the increase in the number of government employees
during this period, there was relative stability in union member-
ship. It is possible that the existence of three unions and the
concurrent confusion did not present a desirable picture to the
average public employee. In the realm of legislation, the several
unions defeated their primary goal of aiding public employees
by pursuing their own individual goals in a highly competitive
manner.
Presently the Postal Clerks Union has 301,155 members up
from 139,000 in 1964, and the Letter Carriers count 203,928 as
members, 35,000 more than six years ago.
26
B. Executive Order 10988: The Kennedy Order
The major landmark for future expansion of public employee
unions was the promulgation of Executive Order 10988 in 1962.
23 It was this period that saw the beginning of the public employee shifting
his identification to the employee in private enterprise rather than maintaining a
separate identification of government employee. Moskowitz, Mediation of Public
Employee Disputes, 12 LAB. L.J. 54 (1961).24 As of November, 1970 NFFE had consummated 227 executive recognition
agreements and represented 77,099 in 459 units, HIsToRY OF THE UNITED STATES
CiVnL SERvicE supra n.21.
25 For an interesting analysis, see n. 3 supra, at 198-203.
2 6 
See BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr OF THE UNrrEn STATES
No. 349; UNION BECOGNrrioN supra n.21.
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President Kennedy, who owed his close election victory in part
to labor support, responded to organized labor's demands for
recognition and consultation in the federal civil service. The
President assembled a task force to investigate the problems in
federal employment policies. Former Secretary of Labor, Arthur
Goldberg, stated the problem succintly when he said:
Fifty years ago, in 1912, Congress by the Lloyd-La Follette
Act guaranteed government employees the right to form or-
ganizations. Nothing, however, was done to ensure that the
management officials of the government would recognize the
legitimate role of such organizations in the formulation and
implementation of personnel policies affecting their members
or to provide them with directions in doing so. As a result,
in many areas of the government relations with employee
organizations were sporadic, peripheral and all too frequently
desultory. In candor from time to time the relationship was
one of ill disguised hostility.27
The task force numbers recognized the "obvious dissimilar-
ities" between "conditions of public and private employment."
However, they clearly acknowledged "that certain of the ground
rules which Congress had laid down for employee-management
relations in the private economy should be carried to the Federal
Government in order to ensure that the public interest and the
interests of individual employees are protected."28 The view
that government employees are entirely different from their
counterparts in private enterprise was rejected, thus finally dis-
pelling the myth that government employment is intrinsically
different from employment in private enterprise.
Prior to issuance of this Executive Order, most agencies made
a vague statement about the right to join unions, quickly counter-
balancing the statement with one expressing the guaranteed right
not to join a union.2" Many administrative officials in the civil
27 1Hart, "Government Labors New Frontier-Through Presidential Directive,"
48 VA. L. REv. 905 (1962).2 8 PRpSmENT's TASK FORCE, REP. ON EPLOYEE-MANAGmENT RELATIONS IN
THE FEDEAL SERvIcEs 7 (1961).2 9 HAIIT, COLLECrIVE BARAINING I THE FEDmRAL Civi. SERviCE, 77 (1961)
gives a thorough treatment of all the problems in the pre-10988 stage. Noting
particularly that career professionals in the specialized field of federal personnel
management were bypassed in drafting the Order in preference for Arthur Gold-
berg and Daniel Patrick Moynihan.
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service stated that they felt that all personnel problems could
be solved by and with the merit system and that there was some-
thing wrong with a government employee who wants to join
a labor organization."0 The President's task force found that of
the fifty-seven departments and agencies studied, twenty-two
did not have any labor relations policy at all, and eleven had
only the minimal policy of allowing employees to have the right
to join or not to join a union which does not assert the right to
strike or overthrow the government.
Executive Order 10988 clearly granted federal government
employees "the right freely and without fear of penalty or re-
prisal, to form, join and assist any employee organization or to
refrain from such activity." 2 The order also places responsibility
on agency and department heads to "assure that employees in
the agency are apprised on the rights described... and (to see)
that no interference, restraint, coercion or discrimination is
practiced within such agency to encourage or discourage mem-
bership in any employee organization."3 3 Basic guidelines were
established in order to assure the compatibility of the labor or-
ganization with the fundamental dictates of democratic govern-
ment.3 4 The order also took cognizance of the then well publicized
labor problem of union corruption and sought to eliminate its
influence in public employment by denying recognition to any
labor organization, "which the head of the agency considers to
be... subject to corrupt influence or influences opposed to basic
democratic principles." 5 Even though the right to organize was
clearly granted, the Executive Order also sought to protect the
individual employee in his right to continue to bring "matters of
personal concern to the attention of appropriate officials" and to
choose "his own representative in a grievance or appellate
action." 0
Thus, the federal government, after the existence of over
one hundred years of employee organizations, finally officially
80 For an early cry for reform see CARPENTER, THE UNFNrnm Btxsnwss or
CIVIL SERVICE FORM, 58 (1952).
31 Id. at 898-99.32 Exec. Order No. 10988 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 180 (Supp. 1962), 5 U.S.C. § 631
(1964).
33 Id.
34 Id. at § 2.
35 Id. at § 3(a).
36 Id. at § 3.
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recognized that the participation of employees in the formulation
and implementation of personnel policies is part of good ad-
ministration and in the public interest. There is little doubt
that the orderly conduct of management-employee relations tends
ultimately to lead to more efficient government. Executive
Order 10988 established the equality of treatment for union
members and non-union members and abolished what some gov-
ernment workers who belonged to unions referred to as "second
class citizenship." It took many years for the federal government,
which had previously guarded the rights of workers in private
enterprise, to establish similar rights for its own workers. Never-
theless, white collar employees' reluctance to join unions remains
as prevalent in government as it is in private enterprise. The
attitudes of government employees are also shaped by the years
of administrative propaganda that government employees do
not need unions and that the civil service system is all that is
required. Thus, the mere existence of the Executive Order will
not, in and of itself, lead to unionization of all government em-
ployees. However, when the unions demonstrate that they can
accomplish something of value for member employees there
may be a membership explosion, as caution and negativism will
then be diminished.
Paternalism is no longer the dominant mood among admin-
istrators. Unilateral determination of working conditions has
given way to the beginning bilateral discussion of mutual prob-
lems. Administrators now have a mandate to apprise all their
employees of their rights to organize, and the general atmosphere
indicates that the executive branch has adopted an even-handed
approach in dealing with employee unions. The Executive Order
established a firm foundation for the organization of federal
employees and the initiation of collective bargaining. Hope for
the future is bolstered when one looks at the continuing success
of the Tennessee Valley Authority's labor relations, which have
permitted organizations and collective bargaining from its in-
ception.3r
37 see CASE PERSONNEL POLICY IN A PUBLIC AGENCY-THE TVA EXPERENCE.
The original polcy statement states that "employees of the Tennessee Valley
Authority shall have the right to organize and designate representatives of their
own choosing. In the exercise of this right they shall be free from any and all
(Continued on next page)
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If. EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491: THE NIxON OxER
In the past eight years since the promulgation of Executive
Order 10988, over one and a half million employees, representing
more than half of the federal work force, have come to be repre-
sented by labor organizations. From the twenty-nine exclusive
units in TVA and the Department of the Interior, covering about
19,000 employees, which existed prior to the Order, exclusive
union representation has grown to 3,010 exclusive units in thirty-
five agencies covering 1,542,111 employees, fifty-eight percent of
the total federal work force subject to the Order. Exclusive recog-
nition now covers eighty-seven percent of all postal employees,
eighty-one percent of wage (blue collar) employees, and thirty-
five percent of salaried (white collar) employees.' Also, many
thousands more have union representation in 915 units of Formal
recognition and a similar number of Informal units. 9 Organiza-
tion has resulted in the consummation of nearly 1,400 basic
labor-management agreements and a substantial number of sup-
plemental agreements. With this enormous expansion in em-
ployee organization and the passage of time, union representatives
and agency managers found it increasingly difficult to operate
under policies formulated in 1962, and through the Civil Service
Commission requested that significant changes be made in the
program in order to adjust it to present day conditions.
On September 10, 1969, a study committee of high-level fed-
eral officials,40 (hereinafter referred to as the Shultz committee)
submitted to President Nixon its "Report and Recommendations
on Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Service."4' After
intensive review and evaluation of the federal labor-management
relations program created in 1962 by President Kennedy's
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
restraint, interference, or coercion on the part of the management and supervisory
staff (TVA Employee Relations Policy, Knoxville Tenn.- TVA 1945, p. 2.) See
also, Thompson, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: The TVA Experience
and Its Implications for Other Government Agencies, 17 LAB. L. J. 89 (1966).
38 UnioN RECOGNITION supra n.21.
39 Id.
40 The members of the study committee were Secretary of Labor George P.
Shulz; Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird; Postmaster General, Winton M.
Blount; Director of the Budget, Robert P. Mayo; and the Chairman of the U.S.
Civil Service Commission, Robert E. Hampton.
41 See LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN Tim FEDERAL SERVIcE: REPORT
AND REcoxmENDAflONS, ExEcuTrVE ORDER 11491, (Oct. 29, 1969).
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Executive Order No. 10988, the committee reported that "the
1962 order produced some excellent results, beneficial to both
agencies and employees.."42 The Report noted that there had
been "substantial" accomplishments under the program; that
"improved personnel policies and working conditions have been
achieved in a number of areas;" and "[t]hese gains have been
achieved while maintaining a labor-management atmosphere of
reasonable harmony." In its transmittal letter to the President,
the committee stated of Executive Order 10988 that "[tihe basic
objective of employee-Management cooperation established by
that Order was sound in concept and has been effective in
practice."
43
As a result of the rapid growth in union representation, the
Shultz committee noted that:
it is the opinion of both labor organizations and agency
managers that significant changes are needed in program
policies if the program is to continue on a constructive course
in the future. The size and scope of labor-management rela-
tions activity today has produced conditions far different
from those to which the policies of the 1962 order were
addressed.
The Shultz committee reported, while "overall the program is
healthy and thriving," and many of its features continued to
work well and should be retained, change in other areas of the
program would be desirable. After pointing out six major areas
where it thought that the program should be changed,44 the
committee stated its belief that:
desirable changes in these areas can be accomplished without
serious disruption to the ongoing program by a new order
which builds upon the foundation of experience gained by
the parties under Executive Order 10988. The changes should
remove many of the current causes of agency and union
dissatisfaction and provide a framework for responsible deal-
ings by both sides in the future.
4 5
421d. at 31.
43 Id. at 17.
44 Id. at 17.
45 id. at 32.
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On October 29, 1969, President Nixon signed Executive
Order No. 11491.46 The new Executive Order, which became
effective on January 1, 1970, revoked President Kennedy's Exec-
utive Order No. 10988 together with the Standards of Conduct
for Employee Organizations and the Code of Fair Labor Prac-
tices issued thereunder. 7 While continuing to adhere to the
basic policies underlying the Kennedy order, the Nixon order
instituted various changes along the lines recommended by the
study committee. As the Shultz committee report suggests, and
as analysis of Executive Order No. 11491 confirms, the Nixon
order was not intended to create an entirely new federal labor
relations program. The order was issued only after intensive
study of the functioning and malfunctioning of the Kennedy
order, which was the nation's first attempt to achieve a com-
prehensive code governing Federal employee labor relations.
Executive Order No. 11491 must be viewed as an attempt to
adjust some of the earlier order's features which, after seven
years experience, were found to be cumbersome and unwork-
able. The Shultz committee stressed the need for redefinition
and clarity. Compared to the earlier order, the Nixon order is
a model of clarity and precision of expression.
The Nixon order reaffirmed the organizational rights of fed-
eral employees and generally continued the protections afforded
them by the Kennedy order; the Nixon order also reaffirmed
many of the restraints placed upon federal employees by the
earlier order. By adopting various definitions and policy rules
evolved by the National Labor Relations Board, the Nixon order
also brings government labor practice closer to that of the private
sector. Certain provisions of the Nixon order appear to favor
unions; other provisions appear to favor management. The
regulations called for by the order have not yet been tested,
and therefore at the present time, in the absence of that exten-
sive administrative practice that transforms words into living law,
it is difficult to determine where the balance lies.
It is clear, however, that Executive Order No. 11491 is an
improvement over the earlier program in that it creates a cen-
46 3 C.F.R. 451 (Supp. 1970) 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (Supp. V 1970).
47 Id. at § 26.
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tral authority to administer the program (in place of the piece-
meal, agency-by-agency approach of the Kennedy order); it
simplifies the forms of recognition; it changes the rules governing
the negotiating process and the status of the resulting agreements;
and it clarifies the status of supervisors and removes them from
the basic federal labor-relations framework.
A. Employee Rights Under Executive Order No. 11491
Executive Order No. 11491 does not confer organizational
rights upon all federal employees. Like the Kennedy order, the
Nixon order excludes from coverage employees of the FBI and
CIA; both orders also exclude employees of other agency com-
ponents having intelligence, investigative or security functions
when the agency's head, in his sole judgment, determines that
the order cannot be applied to those employees consistent with
national security requirements. 4  Executive Order No. 11491
also follows the Kennedy order by providing that an agency
head may, in his sole judgment, suspend any provision of the
order (except for section 22, which grants non-veteran appeal
rights) in agency installations outside the United States.49 The
Nixon order, however, goes further than the Kennedy order by
excluding from coverage employees of an agency component
which has as a primary function the investigation of employee
integrity in the performance of official duties, when the head of
the agency determines in his sole judgement, that the order can-
not be applied in a manner consistent with the internal security
of the agency." The new order also prohibits employees who
administer a labor relations law or the order, from being repre-
sented by a union which might be a party to a matter which the
employee would consider in the course of his official duties. 51
Like the Kennedy order, the Nixon order guarantees to those
federal employees covered thereby the right to join or not to
join a labor organization. 2 The Nixon order adopts its prede-
cessor's prohibition of the "gag rule" in federal employment by
providing that the right to "assist" a labor organization includes
481d. at § 3(b)(1)(2)(3).
491d. at § 3(c).
5Old. at § 8(b)(4).
51Id. at § 3(d).52 Id. at § I(a).
[Vol. 59
FEnzEAL EMPLOYEE LABOR RELATIONS
"presentation of its views to officials of the executive branch,
the Congress, or other appropriate authority."53  Both orders
guarantee to the employee the right to be a union officer or
representative except in situations where there would be a con-
flict of interest (the Nixon order adds the appearance of a con-
flict of interest to this limitation) or when such action by the
employee would be otherwise incompatible with law or official
duties.54
B. Supervisory Exclusion
Unlike its predecessor, Executive Order No. 11491 places
various restrictions on the organizational rights of supervisors
and virtually removes them from the normal framework of federal
labor relations. By adopting the basic definition and the policy
of the National Labor Relations Act with respect to supervisors,
the Nixon order brings federal labor relations law closer to
practice in the private economic sector.
Executive Order No. 11491 defines a "supervisor" as:
an employee having authority, in the interest of an
agency, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees,
or responsibility to direct them, or to evaluate their per-
formance, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the fore-
going the exercise of authority is not of a merely routine
or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgmentr 5
The order also defines a "labor organization" as not including
"management officials or supervisors, and provides that a unit
which includes a supervisor is not an appropriate unit.57 A super-
visor may not be an officer or representative of a labor organiza-
tion.58 The order does, however, permit the continued exclusive
recognition of "units of management officials or supervisors rep-
resented by labor organizations" which traditionally represent
53 Id.
54 Id. at §(b).55 Id. at§ 2()
56 ld. at § 2(e) (1).
57id. at 10b)(1).
58 Id. at § l(b),
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these officials in private industry.59 All other supervisors are now
excluded from units existing on the effective date of the order.60
Unlike the Kennedy order, Executive Order No. 11491 establishes
a system for agency communication with associations of super-
visors.6' Further Executive Order No. 11491 excludes from em-
ployee units guards62 and, in some circumstances, professionals.63
C. A Central Body to Administer the Program
Employee rights vis-a'-vis management and unions are mean-
ingful only ff they can be enforced. One of the most serious
flaws of Executive Order 10988 was that it established an agency-
by-agency approach to labor relations problems and invested
agency heads with prime responsibility for the program. Execu-
tive Order No. 11491 attempts to solve many of the problems
caused by this approach by creating a central authority to ad-
minister the program.
Executive Order No. 10988 made each agency responsible
for observing and enforcing the order in its own operations.
64
The Civil Service Commission provided technical assistance and
advice to management and "from time to time," reported to the
President; the Department of Labor also rendered some assist-
ance.65 It has been contended this was "a procedure whereby
the employer itself is free to make all the decisions."6 6 Under
the Kennedy order, the head of an agency, with the assistance
of the Department of Labor, determined the appropriateness of
units sought and whether a union represented a majority of the
employees in such a unit so as to be entitled to (exclusive) recog-
nition. The Kennedy order also provided that the parties them-
selves agree on "appropriate techniques" for the "negotiation of
59Id. at § 24(a)(2).60 Id. at § 24(d).
61Id. at § 7(e).
62 Id. at § 10 (b) (3).
63 Id. at § 10(b) (4). Professionals may be included in a unit with non-
professional employees only if a majority of the professional employees vote for
inclusion in the unit. The word "Professional" is not defined in the order.64 Exec. Order 10988 §§ 11, 12, 13. 3 C.F.R. 184, 6 U.S.C. § 631 (1964).
65 Id.
66 Report of Federal Bar Council Committee on Labor Law Comparing
Executive Order 11491 with State Laws, BNA Gov'T EMPL YEE: REL. REP. No.
387 at G-3 (1971).
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an agreement, or any question arising thereunder." While a
union with exclusive recognition could arbitrate grievances, such
arbitration was limited in scope and advisory in nature.67 Execu-
tive Order No. 11491 replaces the Kennedy order's agency-by-
agency approach with a three-tiered organization for central
administration of the program. The Nixon order places ultimate
administrative responsibility in a Federal Labor Relations Coun-
cil, which is composed of the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission (who is also Chairman of the Council), the Secre-
tary of Labor, "an official of the Executive Office of the President"
and "such other officials of the executive branch as the President
may designate from time to time."68 The Council's function is
to set policy; it is authorized to decide "major policy issues," to
"prescribe regulations," and to report to the President.69 Subject
to its own regulations, the Council acts as a final appellate body
on labor-management questions other than negotiation impasses
on substantive issues.7° Under its own regulations, the Council
may also "consider ...other matters it deems appropriate to
assure the effectuation of the purposes of this Order."
71
The Nixon order also establishes the Federal Services Im-
passes Panel, which consists of "at least three members ap-
pointed by the President, one of whom he designates as chair-
67 Note 73 supra, at § 8(a) (b). § 8.(a). Agreements entered into or negotiated
in accordance with this order with an employee organization which is the ex-
clusive representative of employees in an appropriate unit may contain provisions,
applicable only to employees in the unit, concerning procedures for consideration of
grievances. Such procedures (1) shall conform to standards issued by the Civil
Service Commission, and (2) may not in any manner diminish or impair any rights
which would otherwise be available to any employee in the absence of an agree-
ment providing for such procedures.
(b) Procedures established by an agreement which are otherwise in con-
formity with this section may include provisions for the arbitration of grievances.
Such arbitration (1) shall be advisory in nature with any decisions or recommenda-
tions subject to the approval of the agency head; (2) shall extend only to the
interpretation or application of agreements or agency policy and not to changes
in or proposed changes in agreements or agency policy; and (3) shall be invoked
only with the approval of the individual employee or employees concerned. Id.
68 Supra n.46 at § 4(a).
60 Id. at § 4(b).
70 (c) The Council may consider, subject to its regulations-
(1) Appeals from decisions of the Assistant Secretary issued pursuant
to § 6 of this Order;
2) Appeals on negotiability issues as provided in § II(c) of this Order;
3) Exceptlisons to arbitration awards; and
4 Other matters it deems appropriate to assure the effectuation of the
purposes of this Order. Id. at § 4(c).
71 Id.
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man."72 The Panel is officially "an agency within the Council"
and the Council provides the Panel with needed services and
staff assistance. Pursuant to regulations it prescribes, and in its
own discretion, the Panel may consider negotiation impasses
on substantive issues and "may take any action it considers neces-
sary to settle an impasse." Arbitration or third-party fact-finding
with recommendations may be used by the parties to resolve
the impasse only when authorized by the Panel."3
Executive Order No. 11491 entrusts the Assistant Secretary
of Labor for Labor-Management Relations with broad powers for
the day-to-day administration of the program. Except when a
matter involves the Department of Labor,"4 the Assistant Secre-
tary is empowered in cases involving exclusive recognition to
"decide questions as to the appropriate unit . . . and related
issues," to supervise elections and certify the results;75 to decide
questions of eligibility of 'labor organizations" for "national con-
sultation rights" under criteria prescribed by the Federal Labor
Relations Council; 0 and, except in certain cases, 7 to "decide"
complaints alleging unfair labor practices and alleged violations
of the standards of conduct for labor organizations ." In all of
these matters, the Assistant Secretary is authorized to require
an agency or a labor organization to cease and desist from
violating the Executive Order. He may also require it "to take
such affirmative action as he considers appropriate to effectuate
the policies of this Order."79 The Assistant Secretary's decisions
in these matters are subject to review by the Federal Labor Re-
lations Council, under regulations prescribed by the Council
itself.8 0 The Assistant Secretary is authorized to "prescribe regula-
tions needed to administer his functions under this Order."8 '
In order to carry out his extensive duties, the Assistant Secretary
721d. at § 5(c).
73 Id. at § 17.
741Id. at § 6(e). In such cases, the duties of the Assistant Secretary under the
Order are performed by a member of the Civil Service Commission designated by
the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission.
751d. at § 6(a)(1)(2).
76 Id. at § 6(a (3).
77Id. at § 19(d).
78 Id. at § 6(a)(4).
79 Id. at § 6(b).
S9 Id. at § 4(c)(1).
81Id. at § 6(d).
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is empowered to call on other agencies for services and for the
assistance of their employees.8 2
D. Labor Organizations Under Executive Order No. 11491
In order to be accorded rights under the Kennedy or Nixon
order, a union must meet certain organizational requirements.
It could only seek recognition in a unit determined to be "ap-
propriate." A union meeting the organizational requirements,
and which demonstrates it has the requisite amount of employee
support in an "appropriate" unit is entitled to be accorded one
of the forms of recognition provided by each of the orders.
Under Executive Order No. 10988, only a union that qualified
as an "employee organization" was eligible for recognition and
the rights attendant thereon.83 The Kennedy order excluded from
the definition of "employee organization" a union which asserts
the right to strike or to assist in a strike against the United States
government or an agency thereof; or which advocates the over-
throw of the government; or which discriminates in terms of
membership based on race, color, creed or national origin. The
order also provided that recognition would not be granted to an
employee organization which the agency's head "considers to
be so subject to corrupt influences or influences opposed to basic
democratic principles that recognition would be inconsistent with
the objectives of this order." 5
President Nixon's study committee recommended that the
term 'labor organization" be substituted for "employee organiza-
tion" and that it be redefined.86 Executive Order No. 11491 ac-
cords recognition to "labor organizations" 7 retaining in the defini-
tion thereof the same qualifications as in the Kennedy order but
excluding, in addition, organizations which discriminate on the
basis of sex or which consist of management officials or super-
visors.88 The Nixon order, however, removes from agency heads
the power to disqualify an organization from recognition because
82 Id. at § 6 e).
83 Exec. Order 10.988 §§ 11-13,5 U.S.C. § 631 (1964).
84 Id. at §§ 2, 3.
85Id. at § 3(a).86 See n.41 supra at 18.
87 See n.56 supra at §§ 17(a), 18(g).881d. at § 2(c) (1) (3).
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of corrupt or undemocratic influence. Under the Nixon order,
such determinations are to be made by the Assistant Secretary
of Labor 9 and are subject to review by the Federal Labor Re-
lations Council 0
In order to be accorded recognition under Executive Order
No. 11491, a labor organization must comply with "standards of
conduct" set out in the order.9 The standards require that a
labor organization "subscribes" to basic democratic principles
and adheres to internal democratic procedures (such as holding
periodic elections subject to "recognized safeguards" and accord-
ing members equal treatment and "fair process" in disciplinary
proceedings); that it excludes from office "persons affiliated with
Communist or other totalitarian movements and persons identified
with corrupt influences;" that it prohibits officers and agents
from having business or financial conflicts of interest; and that
it maintains "fiscal integrity."92 All labor organizations seeking
recognition under the Nixon order must file "financial and other
reports" to establish compliance with these standards,93 and the
Assistant Secretary is directed to prescribe regulations to effectu-
ate the standards. 94
E. Determination of the Appropriate Unit
One of the major recommendations submitted by President
Nixon's study committee was that the new Executive Order
contain "improved criteria for appropriate units."9" While it
adopted the Kennedy order's basic "community of interest" ap-
proach to unit determinations,96 Executive Order No. 11491
89Id. at § 6(a).
9OId. at § 4c (1).
91 Id. at 18.92 Id. at § 18(a).93 Id. at § 18(c).
94 Id. at § 18(d).
95 See n.41 supra at 31.
96 See n.29 supra at § 6(e), That section provides:
An agency shall recognize an employee organization as the exclusive repre-
sentative of the employees, in an appropriate unit when such organization is eligible
for formal recognition pursuant to section 5 of this order, and has been designated
or selected by a majority of the employees of such unit as the representative of such
employees in such unit. Units may be established on any plant or installation,craft, functional or other basis which will ensure a clear and identifiable com-
munity of interest among the employees concerned, but no unit shall be established
solely on the basis of the extent to which employees in the proposed unit have
organized. Except where otherwise required by established practice, prior agree-
(continued on next page)
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added as a criterion for consideration whether the unit established
"will promote effective dealings and efficiency of agency opera-
tions."07 Unlike the Kennedy order, the Nixon order also excludes
supervisors from new units containing other employees; 98 the
Nixon order also excludes guards from such units 9  Under
Executive Order No. 10988 unit questions involving exclusive
recognition were determined by the agency head, with the as-
sistance of the Department of Labor.100 The Nixon order trans-
fers to the Assistant Secretary of Labor the power to determine
the appropriate unit in such cases with a right of appeal to the
council.,'
F. Recognition of Unions
Executive Order No. 10988 provided for three forms of recog-
nition-exclusive, formal and informal-depending on the degree
of support a union enjoyed among the unit's employees.0 2
Exclusive recognition as representative of all employees in an
appropriate unit was accorded to an "employee organization"
which had ten percent membership in the unit and which was
designated or selected as representative by a majority of em-
ployees in the unit.03 An employee organization with exclusive
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
ment, or special circumstances, no unit shall be established for purposes of ex-
clusive recognition which includes (1) any managerial executive, (2) any em-
ployee engaged in Federal personnel work in other than a purely clerical capacity,
(3) both supervisors who officially evaluate the performance of employees and the
employees whom they supervise, or (4) both professional employees and non-
professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for
inclusion in such unit.
97 See n.66 supra at § 10(b).
98Id. at § 10(b) (1). Supervisors were to be excluded from existing units by
January 1, 1971. See § 24(d), 3 C.F.R. 464 (Supp. 1970), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (Supp.
V 1970).
99Id. at § 10(b) (3). In its Report, supra, n.2, at 35, the Shultz committee
analoized to practice in the private sector where, it noted,. a unit is not considered appropriate for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining if it includes together with other employees any individual
employed as a guard . . .; nor may a labor organization be certified as
the representative of employees in a unit of guards if such organization
admits to membership... employees other than guards. Labor and man-
agement relations in the Federal service has developed to the point
where these same considerations should be applied." (Emphasis sup-
plied).
10OExec. Order No. 10,988 § 11, 3 C.F.R. 134 (Supp. 1962) 5 U.S.C. 631
(1964).
101Exec. Order No. 11,491 §§ 6(a) (1), 4(c) (1), 3 C.F.R. 453, (Supp. 1970)
5 U.S.C. § 7301 (Supp. V 1970).
' 0 2See n.64 supra.
103 Id. at § 6(a).
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recognition had the right to act for and to negotiate agreements
covering all employees in the unit and was to be given the
opportunity to be represented at discussions between management
and employees involving grievances, personnel policies and prac-
tices, or other matters affecting general working conditions of
employees in the unit."0 4 The exclusive representative also had
the obligation to represent the interests of all employees in the
unit without discrimination or regard to union membership. The
agency was required to negotiate with respect to matters af-
fecting working conditions, "so far as may be appropriate subject
to law and policy requirements;10 5 it was not required to negotiate
on "such areas of discretion and policy as the mission of the
agency, its budget, its organization and the assignment of its
personnel, or the technology of performing its work." 0 6 Any
agreement entered into with a union having exclusive recognition
had to be approved by the agency head and was subject to exist-
ing or future laws and regulations, including policies set forth
in the Federal Personnel Manual and agency regulations.
0 7
Agency management also retained the rights to direct, hire, pro-
mote, assign, retain, discipline or lay off employees; to "maintain
the efficiency of the Government operations entrusted to them;"
to determine the methods, means and personnel to perform its
operations and to take "whatever actions may be necessary to
carry out the mission of the agency in situations of emergency."lo8
Agreements entered into with employee organizations having
exclusive recognition could contain grievance procedures con-
forming to standards issued by the Civil Service Commission;
such procedures could not impair rights which would otherwise
be available to employees. 19 Such grievance procedures could
include provision for advisory arbitration on issues of interpreta-
tion of, but not changes in, agreements or agency policy."0 The
arbitration procedures could be invoked only with the approval
of the individual employee or employees concerned; any decisions
1
0 4 Id. at § 6(b).
305 Id.
106 Id.
LOTId. at § 7(1).
-18Id. at § 7(2).
109 Id. at 8(a).
110 Id. at § 8(b).
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or recommendations emanating therefrom were subject to the ap-
proval of the agency head.
Under Executive Order No. 10988, an employee organization
was accorded formal recognition as representative of its members
in a unit when the agency determined that the employee or-
ganization had "a substantial and stable membership" of ten
percent of the unit and that no other employee organization was
qualified for exclusive recognition for the unit."' National formal
recognition could be accorded an employee organization when
the agency head, in his sole judgment, determined that the or-
ganization had "a sufficient number of local organizations or a
sufficient total membership within such agency."1 2 An employee
organization accorded formal recognition had the right to be
consulted by an agency in the formulation and implementation
of personnel policies of interest to its members; the employee
organization also had a right to raise such matters for discussion
with agency officials. Also, under Executive Order No. 10988,
an employee organization was accorded informal recognition as
representative of its members in a unit when the organization
was not qualified for exclusive or formal recognition. Such recog-
nition could be accorded even though another employee organiza-
tion had been accorded exclusive or formal recognition in the
same unit."3 An organization with informal recognition could
present to the agency the views of its members; the agency was
not, however, required to consult with such an employee organiza-
tion in the formulation of personnel or other such policies.
President Nixon's study committee recommended "(r)evision
in the multiple forms of recognition authorized and improved
criteria for . . . consultation and negotiation rights."" 4 The
committee also recommended that a new Executive Order create
"(a)n enlarged scope of negotiation and better rules for insuring
that it is not arbitrarily or erroneously limited by management
representatives."
Executive Order No. 11491 abolished formal and informal
recognition." 5 The Nixon order provides that exclusive recog-
IlIld. at § 5()
112 Id. at § 5).
113 Id. at § 4.
114 See n.41 supra at 81.
115 See nA6 supra at § 10(a).
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nition be accorded to a "labor organization" selected by a majority
of employees in the appropriate unit in a secret ballot election."'
The Nixon order thus ended the practice under the earlier order
of granting exclusive recognition on the basis of membership or
authorization cards and requires instead that the labor organiza-
tion prove its majority claim in an election. Executive Order
No. 11491 brought federal practice closer to that in the private
sector by eliminating its predecessor's requirement that a union
seeking exclusive recognition have a membership of ten percent
of the employees in the union. A similar result was achieved by
the Nixon order's elimination of the administrative rule enacted
pursuant to the Kennedy order that exclusive recognition would
be accorded after a secret ballot election only if sixty percent of
the eligible voters had participated in the election.
1 7
A labor organization with exclusive recognition has essentially
the same rights in representing its employees under both the
Kennedy and Nixon orders." 8 Changes relating to the scope and
administration of negotiated agreements enacted in the Nixon
order may, however, have enlarged the rights of such organiza-
tions.
The Nixon order established national consultation rights for
labor organizations; such rights are similar to those accorded a
labor organization that is accorded national formal recognition
under the Kennedy order. Executive order No. 11491 provides
that, in units not covered by national exclusive recognition, na-
tional consultation rights may be accorded by an agency to a
labor organization "which qualifies under criteria established by
the Federal Labor Relations Council as the representative of a
substantial number of employees of the agency."" 9 When a
136Id. at § 10(a).
317 See e.g., Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451, 453
(1965); cert. denied 882 U.S. 978 (1966). In its Report the Shultz committee
noted that:
There is rather general dissatisfaction with the current rule which re-
quires that at least 60 percent of the employees present and eligible to
vote must participate in order for the election to be considered valid.
It is said that the rule violates the rights of the majority and is in conflict
with standards for labor relations in the private sector. We believe that
the development of sound labor relations will be served better by re-
scinding the rule and recommend that when an election is held the
right of exclusive representation be determined on the basis of selection
by a majority of those voting.
118 See n.55 supra at § 10(e).
119 Id. at § 9(a).
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labor organization has national consultation rights, the agency
must notify it of any proposed changes in personnel policies that
affect the employees it represents and "provide an opportunity
for the organization to comment on the proposed changes;" such
a labor organization may suggest changes in agency personnel
policies and "have its views carefully considered." The labor
organization may also "confer" with the agency on personnel
policy matters and present its views in writing.120 The Nixon
order also provides that "(a)n agency is not required to consult
with a labor organization (holding national consultation rights)
on any matter on which it would not be required to meet and
confer if the organization were entitled to exclusive recognition."
Unlike the Kennedy order, which provided that national formal
recognition could be accorded when, in the opinion of the head
of an agency, it met the relevant criteria,121 the Nixon order
provides that a labor organization may appeal to the Assistant
Secretary of Labor an agency decision not to grant national
consultation rights. 22
C. The Negotiation and Administration of Agreements
Unions accorded exclusive recognition under both the Ken-
nedy and Nixon orders have essentially the same rights to repre-
sent unit members, to negotiate, and to conclude contracts with
federal agencies. Certain changes in the negotiation and applica-
tion of agreements which have been instituted by the Nixon
order appear, however, to have enlarged the powers of labor
organizations. The Nixon order institutes changes in the subjects
and methods permissible in the negotiating process; it also makes
certain changes in the rules governing the application of the
resulting agreements.
The range of issues subject to negotiation by a federal em-
ployees labor organization accorded exclusive recognition is
specifically limited under both the Kennedy and Nixon orders.
The Nixon order continues its predecessor's policy by providing
that the obligation to "meet and confer" does not include:
120 Id. at § 9(b).
121 See n.74 supra at § 5(a).
122 See n.56 supra at § 9(c).
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matters with respect to the mission of an agency; its budget;
its organization; the number of employees; and the numbers,
types, and grades of positions or employees assigned to an
organizational unit, work project or tour of duty; the tech-
nology of performing its work; or its internal security
practices.
1 23
The Nixon orders exclusion of "internal security practices," from
the list of negotiable subjects is new, as is its provision that
agreements may not include a union shop, agency shop or
maintenance of membership clause. 124 Unlike the Kennedy order,
however, the Nixon order enlarges the scope of negotiations in
that it specifically provides for "negotiating agreements provid-
ing appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected
by the impact of realignment of work forces or technological
change."'125 The Nixon order also provides that the parties may
negotiate for the inclusion in agreements of certain new grievance
procedures.
The Nixon order also continues its predecessor's policy by
providing that the parties may meet and confer:
with respect to personnel policies and practices and matters
affecting working conditions so far as may be appropriate
under applicable laws and regulations, including policies set
forth in the Federal Personnel Manual, published agency
policies and regulations, a national or other controlling agree-
ment at a higher level in the agency, and this Order.12 6
123Id. at § 11(b). Compare the Kennedy Order supra n.64 at § 6(b) which
provides in part that:
[T]he agency and an employee organization accorded exclusive recog-
nition shall meet at reasonable times and confer with respect to per-
sonnel policy and practices and matters affecting working conditions, so
far as may be appropriate subject to law and policy requirements. This
extends to the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder, the determination of appropriate techniques, consistent with
the terms and purposes of this order to assist in such negotiations, and
the execution of a written memorandum of agreement or understanding
incorporating any agreement reached by the parties. In exercising
authority to make rules and regationsgrelating to personnel policiesand practices and working conditions, agencies shall have due regard
for te obligation imposed by this section, but such obligation shall not
be construed to extend to such areas of discretion and policy as the
mission of an agency, its budget, its organization and the assignment of
its personnel or the technology of performing its work.
'.
2 4 See n.46 supra at § 12(c).2 5ad.lat§l n(b).
126 Id. at § 11(a). Compare with the Kennedy Order supra n. 123.
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Unlike the Kennedy order, however, the Nixon order provides
for a right of appeal to the Federal Labor Relations Council
on the issue of whether a specific matter is negotiable. 27
Both the Kennedy and Nixon orders provide certain limita-
tions on the application of any agreement which may be reached.
Each order reserves to agency management the right to direct,
hire, promote, assign, retain, discipline or lay off employees; to
maintain efficiency; to determine the methods, means and per-
sonnel for performing work and to take necessary action in an
emergency.128 Each of the orders provides that application of
an agreement is subject to existing or future laws, regulations
and Federal Personnel Manual policies; the Nixon order, how-
ever, adds a significant protection against obdurate agency heads
by providing that the application of an agreement is subject to
subsequently published agency "policies and regulations" only
if those policies and regulations are "required by law or by the
regulations of appropriate authorities, or authorized by the terms
of a controlling agreement at a higher agency level.
29
While both orders provide that all agreements must be ap-
proved by the agency head or his designee, the Nixon order
limits the power of an agency head to disapprove a local agree-
ment by providing that such disapproval must be based solely
upon conflict with applicable law, policy or regulations. 30
Executive Order No. 11491 adds to the negotiation framework
erected under the Kennedy order the requirement that the parties
negotiate "in good faith."' 3 ' The Nixon order also instituted
significant changes in the methods governing the negotiating
process by providing for procedures for the resolution of negotiat-
ing disputes and impasses.
H. Resolution of Negotiating Disputes and Impasses
The Shultz committee noted that although Executive Order
No. 10988 'lacks any express procedures for use if an impasse
is reached in negotiations, other than a prohibition against the
use of arbitration," federal agencies had nonetheless used "various
127 See n.46 supra at § 11(c)(4).
128 Id. at § 12(b). See also n.64 supra at § 7.
129 See n.46 supra at § 12(a). See also n.64 supra at § 7.
'
3 0 See n.46 supra at § 15, and see n.64 supra at § 7.
'13 See n.46 supra at § 11(a). See also n.64 at § 7.
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methods" to bring about settlements in negotiations, including
"joint fact-finding committees, referral to higher authority within
the agency ...and, to a limited extent, mediation by private
third parties."3 2 The committee also reported that the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service had, with great success, pro-
vided services to the federal program "on a limited, experimental
basis."13 The Shultz committee recommended that the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service be authorized to extend full
services to the federal program, and when even those services
were unsuccessful in bringing the parties "to the point of full
agreement," that "either or both parties should have the right
to seek settlement through a governmental body established for
that purpose."' 34 Executive Order No. 11491 adopted the recom-
mendation: that the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
shall "provide services and assistance to Federal agencies in the
resolution of negotiation disputes."13 ' The Shultz committee also
specifically recommended the establishment of the Federal Service
Impasses Panel.'36
Executive Order No. 11491 created the Federal Service' Im-
passes Panel' 3 7 and provides that "ff voluntary arrangements, in-
cluding the services of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service or other third-party mediation, fail to resolve a negotiation
impasse, either party may request the Federal Service Impasses
Panel to consider the matter." 38  In its discretion, and under
regulations that it is authorized to prescribe, the Federal Service
Impasses Panel can decide whether it will consider the matter.
The Panel may recommend procedures to the parties, including
arbitration or third-party fact-finding with recommendations, or
it "may settle the impasse by appropriate action." 39 This appears
to be a very broad grant of power as the Nixon order authorizes
the Panel to "take any action it considers necessary to settle an
impasse."140
132 See n.41 supra at 40.
133Id.
'34 Id.
135 See n.46 supra at 16.
136 See n.41 supra at 40.
1
3 7 For composition of the Panel, see n.46 supra.
138 See n.56 supra § 17.
139 Id.
140 Id. at § 5(b).
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I. Conduct of Labor Organizations and Management
In order to protect employees, labor organizations and man-
agement; and to insure that the purposes of the order are
achieved, Executive Order No. 11491 sets forth a list of actions
'prohibited both to agency management and labor organizations.
Executive Order No. 11491 provides that agency management
"shall not:
(1) interfere with, restrain, or coerce an employee in the
exercise of the rights assured by this Order;
(2) encourage or discourage membership in a labor organiza-
tion by discrimination in regard to hiring, tenure, promotion,
or other conditions of employment;
(3) sponsor, control, or otherwise assist a labor organization,
except that any agency may furnish customary and routine
services and facilities under section 23 of this Order when
consistent with the best interests of the agency, its employees,
and the organization, and when the services and facilities are
furnished, if requested, on an impartial basis to organizations
having equivalent status;
(4) discipline or otherwise discriminate against an employee
because he has filed a complaint or given testimony under this
Order;
(5) refuse to accord appropriate recognition to a labor or-
ganization qualified for such recognition; or
(6) refuse to consult, confer, or negotiate with a labor or-
ganization as required by this Order. 41
These prohibitions on management activities are virtually identi-
cal to the prohibitions contained in the Standards of Conduct
for Employee Organizations and Code of Fair Labor Practices
issued pursuant to Executive Order No. 10988.142 Unlike the
1411d. at § 19(a).
142 Standards of Conduct for Employee Organizations and Code of Fair Labor
Practices, [hereinafter Standards] 28 Fed. Reg. 5127, 5130 (May 23, 1963).
The Standards were issued pursuant to Exec. Order No. 10988, 313 provide in
§ 3.2 that:
(a) Agency management is prohibited from:
1) Interfering with, restraining or coercing any employee in the
exercise of the rights assured by Executive Order No. 10988, including
those set forth in Section 1 of the Order;
(2) Encouraging or discouraging membership in any employee
(Continued on next page)
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Kennedy order, however, the Nixon order provides that if al-
legations of violation of the aforementioned paragraphs (except
for paragraph 3) are subject to an "established grievance or
appeals procedure," that procedure is the exclusive procedure
for resolving the complaint.143 All complaints that cannot be so
resolved are to be decided by the Assistant Secretary of Labor.'
The Standards and Code issued pursuant to the Kennedy order
provided that such decisions were to be made by the agencies
concerned.' 46 The transfer of such matters to the Assistant Secre-
tary of Labor, who has broad powers to decide such cases and
to direct remedial action, is a further diminution of the power
given agency heads by the Kennedy order.
14
1
Executive Order No. 11491 provides that a labor organization
shall not:
(1) interfere with, restrain, or coerce an employee in the
exercise of his rights assured by this Order;
(2) attempts to induce agency management to coerce an
employee in the exercise of his rights under this Order;
(3) coerce, attempt to coerce, or discipline, fine or take other
economic sanction against a member of the organization as
punishment or reprisal for, or for the purpose of hindering or
impeding his work performance, his productivity, or the dis-
charge of his duties owed as an officer or employee of the
United States;
(4) call or engage in a strike, work stoppage, or slowdown;
picket an agency in a labor-management dispute; or condone
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
organization by discrimination in regard to hiring, tenure, promotion or
other conditions of employment;
(3) Sponsoring, controlling or otherwise assisting any employee
organization, except that an agency may furnish customary and routine
services and facilities pursuant to Section 10 of the Order where con-
sistent with the best interests of the agency, its employees and the
organization, and where such services and facilities are furnished, if
requested, on an impartial basis;
(5) Refusing to accord appropriate recognition to an employee
organization qualified for such recognition;
(6) Refusing to hear, consult, confer or negotiate with an employee
organization as required by the Order.
143 See n.46 supra at § 19(b).
144 See n.46 supra at §§ 3.3, 3.4.
145 The Assistant Secretary is authorized to decide cases involving allegations
of unfair labor practices, with the exception set out in n.143 supra, and accompany-
ing text.1461d. § 19(b).
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any such activity by failing to take affimative action to pre-
vent or stop it;
(5) discriminate against an employee with regard to the
terms or conditions of membership because of race, color,
creed, sex, age, or national origin; or
(6) refuse to consult, confer, or negotiate with an agency
as required by this Order.
147
While these prohibitions are similar to those contained in the
Standards and Code issued pursuant to the Kennedy order, the
Nixon order has added to the list of actions prohibited to labor
organizations and clarified certain others.148  Like the Kennedy
order, the Nixon order also prohibits solicitation of membership,
dues, or the conduct of other organizational activities during
employees' work hours. 49 Executive Order No. 11491, however,
deletes the Kennedy order's provision that official meetings be-
tween representatives and management and recognizes unions
shall, "whenever practicable, be conducted on official time." 50
J. Grievance Procedures
Executive Order No. 10988 provided that agreements nego-
tiated with employee organizations having exclusive recognition
could provide for grievance procedures in conformity with Civil
Service Commission standards provided that the contract pro-
visions did not "diminish or impair" rights otherwise available
to an employee in the absence of the contract.' 51 The provisions
147 See n.14 1 supra. The Standards n.142 provides in § 3.2 at 5180 that:
(b) Employee organizations are prohibited from:
(1) Interfering with, restraining or coercing any employee in the
exercise of the rights assured by Executive Order No. 10988, including
those set forth in section 1 of the Order;
(2) Attempting to induce agency management to coerce any em-
ployee in the enjoyment of his rights under the Order;
(3) Coercing or attempting to coerce, or disciplining, any member
of the organization as punishment or reprisal for, or for the purpose of
hindering or impeding his discharge of his duties owed as an officer or
employee of the United States;
(4) Calling or engaging in any strike, work stoppage, slowdown,
or re ated picketing engaged in as a substitute for such strike, work
stoppage or slowdown, against the Government of the United States;
(5) Discriminating against any employee with regard to the terms
or conditions of membership because of race, color, creed, or national
origin.
148 See n.64 supra at § 9. See also n.46 supra at § 20.
149 See n.46 supra at § 20.
150 See n.64 supra at § 9.
151 Id. at § 8(a),
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so included in an agreement could only be "advisory in nature
with any decisions or recommendations subject to the approval
of the agency head."
152
The Shultz committee reported that while "arbitration of
grievances has worked well and has benefitted both employees
and agencies," there has been instances where a grievance was
referred to arbitration only to have the agency involved modify
or reject the decision.'53 The committee noted that "[lIabor or-
ganizations understandably object to an agency's unilateral right
in this regard." 54 Executive Order No. 11491 attempts to deal
with this objection by permitting labor and management to
fashion their own grievance procedures, which may include bind-
ing arbitration.155 Under the Nixon order, an agreement between
an agency and a labor organization may, consistent with Civil
Service Commission requirements, provide "procedures . . . for
the consideration of employee grievances and of disputes.""5 6
Either party may file exceptions to the "arbitrator's award" with
the Federal Labor Relations Council.157 The Nixon order also
provides that a grievance procedure meeting the aforementioned
requirements "is the exclusive procedure available to employees
in the unit when the agreement so provides." 55
III. TiE PosTAL CoRpoRATiON: GOVEMNIMNT AS A
"PVATE" Emro oYR
For many years, successive administrations thought about
curing an increasingly ailing postal system by establishing it on
an efficient, financially sound, and businesslike basis. A major
effort to reform the Post Office began in the Johnson Administra-
tion when former Postmaster General Laurence F. O'Brien pro-
posed that the postal service be converted into an independent
government corporation which could hire its own management
personnel, set postal rates, borrow money, and bargain collectively
with its employees over wages, hours, and conditions of employ-
ment. In response to this proposal, President Johnson appointed
152 Id. at § 8(b).
153 Supra n.41 at 42.
154 Id.
155 See n.45 supra at §§ 13, 14.
156 Id. at § 13.
L5Id. at § 14(a)(b).
158 Id. at § 13.
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a Commission on Postal Organization, which in mid-1968 recom-
mended the establishment of an independent, self-supporting,
government-owned postal corporation. The matter lay dormant
until May of 1969, when President Nixon sent to Congress his
plan for reorganizing the postal department along the lines sug-
gested by the Johnson Commission. Congress failed to act on
his corporation plan in 1969, although the Senate did pass a
bill (S. 1583) eliminating political patronage in the selection
of postmasters. The impetus towards reform was blunted by
union differences concerning the corporation plan and Con-
gressional opposition to an increase in postal rates.
On March 18, 1971, as a result of substantial inequities in
postal pay and fringe benefits, a major postal strike broke out in
many major cities, spearheaded by the National Association of
Letter Carriers, an AFL-CIO union, and the National Postal
Union, an unaffiliated union. The strike lasted until March 25.
Negotiations began immediately toward a solution of the under-
lying grievances of the postal employees. A settlement was an-
nounced on April 2 which included a promise by the unions that
they would support a postal reorganization bill in return for the
receipt of an immediate six percent pay raise for all Federal
workers (including postal employees) effective retroactively to
December 27, 1969, and an additional eight percent postal pay
raise to be awarded on the enactment of reform legislation.
During April, President Nixon reintroduced his proposal for
an independent government postal agency, and after extended
debate in the House and Senate, the postal reorganization bill
was enacted into law on August 12, 1970.1" The bill, besides
granting an eight percent pay raise retroactive to April 16 for
postal workers, created a postal career service as part of the
Civil Service by retaining existing Civil Service and Veterans'
benefits for postal employees, including retirement rights, but
concurrently transferred responsibility for pay and fringe benefits
to the postal service.
The most important aspect of the bill consists of the changes
made in the employment management section. The Act man-
dated that the National Labor Relations Act shall be employed
in substantial degree to employee-management relations in the
159 Salary Adjustment Act of 1970, Pub. L., No. 90-375 (Apr. 16, 1970).
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postal service. In this manner, the postal service will adopt
precedents of the Board and will conduct their collective negotia-
tions in a manner similar to that utilized in private enterprise.
Under the Act, the NLRB will determine the appropriate units
for collective bargaining. In setting the standards for unit de-
termination, the Act states that a unit shall not include manage-
ment or supervisory personnel, employees engaged in personnel
work, professional employees who do not vote for inclusion in
a proposed unit, and any individual employed as a security
guard. 160 The foregoing provision enables the Board to make
unit determinations based on their own analysis of the existing
situation and leaves open the possibility of the continued ex-
istence of postal industrial unions as they evolved under the
Kennedy and Nixon Executive Orders.
Further the Act provides that the postal service shall afford
exclusive recognition to a labor organization when the organiza-
tion has been selected by a majority of the employees in an ap-
propriate bargaining unit.'"" It does, however, also have a grand-
father clause by which agreements executed under the two
executive orders and in effect on August 12, 1970, covering em-
ployees in the post office department shall continue to be recog-
nized by the postal service until amended by law.162 A petition
for recognition can be filed with the Board accompanied by a
statement signed by at least thirty percent of the employees in
the appropriate unit stating that they demand that an election
be held, but nothing in the enactment prohibits the waiving of
a hearing by stipulation for the purpose of a consent election.6 3
Under the Act, the Board will supervise all elections in a manner
conforming with the processes that they utilize for private in-
dustry. A secret ballot will be made available to all employees
who are eligible to vote, providing each of them with the op-
portunity for choosing the labor organization he wishes to repre-
sent him from among those on the ballot or "no union."164 An
election bar is included which provides that no election shall be
160 Id. at § 1202.
16 1 Id. at § 1203(c).
162 Id. at § 1203(b).
163 Id. at § 1203(d)(e).
164 Id. at § 1204(a).
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held in any bargaining unit within which in the preceding twelve-
month period a valid election has been held."5
The Act does provide a measure of union security by provid-
ing that when organizations hold exclusive recognition, the postal
service shall deduct the regulation and periodic dues of the
organization from the pay of all members in the unit recognized,
if the postal service has received a written assignment from the
employee.' The written assignment shall be irrevocable for a
period of not more than one year.
All collective bargaining agreements between the postal ser-
vice and certified unions will be effective for not less than two
years. The Act provides that the parties may incorporate in their
contract any procedures for the resolution of the grievances and
adverse actions arising under the agreement, including binding
third-party arbitration.0 7 This aspect of the bill perhaps provides
its most truly novel feature and progressive step in that neutral
parties can be summoned in order to solve impasse problems in
a quasi-adjudicatory manner, as opposed to the rendering of an
advisory opinion.
Under the Act, no party to any collective bargaining agree-
ment shall terminate the agreement unless the party desiring
termination or modification serves written notice upon the op-
posing party of his desire to act not less than 90 days prior to
the time it is proposed to make such termination or modification. 8
If the parties fail to resolve their differences following the filing
of the mandated notice, the Director of the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service is ordered to establish a fact-finding
panel which shall issue a report, with or without recommenda-
tions.' 69 If no agreement is reached within 90 days after the
165 Id. at § 1204(c).
160 Id. at § 1205(a)(b).
We have come a long way in our attitude toward check-offs. Witness the
following: "There is no municipal purpose served by the check-off of
wages of civil service employees. Counsel for appellees argue that a
check-off is a convenience to both the municipal appointee and the labor
union. We must be realistic and take judicial notice, of what is generally
known that the check-off is a means of maintaining membership.... The
check-off is contrary to the spirit and purpose of the civil service laws of
the state." Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 71 N.E.2d 246, 253 (Ohio 1947),
167 Id. at § 1206(a) (b).
168 Id. at § 1207(a).
369 Id. at § 1207(b). Behind the implementation of fact finding is a desire
(Continued on next page)
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expiration of the agreement, an arbitration board will be estab-
lished which shall give the parties a full hearing and which will
render a decision binding upon the parties.7
The bill grants to United States District Courts jurisdiction
over actions by the National Labor Relations Board. Suits for
breach of contract between the postal service and labor organiza-
tions may be brought in any district court in the United States
having jurisdiction over the parties without regard to the amount
in controversy. 1 ' In contrast, under the Kennedy and Nixon
executive orders, the unions had no recourse to the courts.
Labor organizations who are recognized by the postal service
pursuant to the provisions of the Act are subject to the reporting
requirements applicable to private unions.7 2 The Secretary of
Labor is granted specific authority to issue by regulation, with
the written concurrence of the postal service, simplifying reports
for any labor organization. 17 The forms, however, may be re-
voked by the Secretary if after due notice and hearing he deems
that the purposes of the reporting action would not be carried
out by filing of the statements.
The last provision of the employee-management agreement
section specifically states that "each employee of the Postal Service
shall have the right freely and without fear of penalty or re-
prisal, to form, join and assist the labor organization or to refrain
from any such activity, and each employee shall be protected
in the exercise of this right."174
Bargaining has begun between the seven national exclusive
postal craft unions and the postal service over the terms of a
two-year collective bargaining agreement.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
to implement and preserve collective bargaining. It is an effort to look to a
viable alternative to economic force in the settlement of contract disputes. Em-
ployees have under this system the social and political power of public opinion
sharpened by fact finding which may force public officials to respond to the
recommendations or lose reputation. Thus through an impartially determined
solution, the strike weapon may become unnecessary. See Balasco, Resolving
Disputes Over Contract Terms in the State Public Service: An Analysis, 16 LAB.
L.J. 541 (196)
170 .1 at § 1207(c) (1), (2).
171 Id. at § 1208.
172 Id. at § 1209(b).
173 Id.
174 For an analysis of state legislation and the various court decisions affecting
the right of state and municipal employees to organize, see Steinbach, Public
Employee Organization: A Constitutionally Protected Right? 16 S.D. L. REv. 258
(1970).
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"The unions' money demands reportedly call for increases
totaling more than 30 percent over the two-year life of the
agreement. They include the following:
* Across-the-board increases of $1,000, effective January 20,
1971 and January 20, 1972;
* Reduction of in-grade steps from 12 to eight with no loss of
pay, the top step being reached in slightly under six years;
* Longevity increases of $500 each after 10, 14, and 18 years of
service;
* Advancement of every bargaining unit employee to the next
highest pay level retroactive to January 20;
* A fund for the 'correction of inequities,' to be established by
management, with sufficient moneys 'to pay an average of
$251 per year per each employee for the purpose of restoring
wage relationships among [Postal Field Service] levels 1
through 6 as they existed as of January 1, 1969;'
A  cost-of-living escalator clause, the adjustments to be made
quarterly; and
* Additional cost-of-living allowances on a statewide basis
where warranted in such high-cost areas as Alaska, Hawaii,
Puerto Rico."' 75
Other demands announced earlier include:
* a ban on layoffs or reductions-in-force over the contract term;
* improved retirement benefits, the details of which will be
provided later;
* a ban on 'unilateral action' by management on any issue con-
cerning wages, hours, or working conditions of employees;
* a non-discrimination clause;
* elimination of the part-time employee category, making all
postal workers 'regular' employees, unless the unions consent
to continuation of the part-time classification;
* a ban on contracting-out;
* union participation in management decisions relative to auto-
mation;
* improved leave entitlements, details of which will be pre-
sented later;
175 See GovERNNT EMLoYEEs EEL. RPT. A-9, A-10, (April 19, 1971).
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• a requirement that all promotions to supervisory positions be
made from the rank-and-file and not from outside;
* definitions of contract terms covering working conditions,
classifications, pay, schedules, rates, and so on; and
* elimination of the two-cent per member per month now as-
sessed the unions by the POD as a service charge for ad-
ministering dues checkoff agreements. 76
Negotiators for the union hoped for an unassisted settlement,
but ninety days after the start of bargaining the unresolved
contract issues were, pursuant to the provisions of the Postal
Reorganization Act, referred to a fact finding panel chosen by
the director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
Of the fifteen names submitted on April 19, 1971, the Postal
Service and the Council of American Postal Employees (repre-
senting the seven unions) had ten days to select one person
for the three man panel. The two fact finders selected name
the third member of the panel. Should they be unable to agree,
the selection will be made by the Director. Following a study
of the issues leading to the impasse, the fact finders, within
forty-five days, will issue a report with or without recommenda-
tions. 177
Simultaneously a referendum was to be held, commencing
April 27, 1971 seeking the ratification of merger plans for five
postal unions. Ballots will be sent to the United Federation of
Postal Clerks, National Federation of Post Office Motor Vehicle
Employees, National Association of Post Office and General
Services Maintenance Employees, National Association of Special
Delivery Messengers, and National Postal Union (hereinafter
NPU). All but NPU are AFL-CIO affiliates and are engaged in
the present negotiations with the Postal Service.
"The voting period will begin on April 28 and end at 10 a.m.
on May 13. A simple majority vote in each union will decide
the issue, and the results of the vote will be tallied by the
union. If ratified, the consolidated organization will be called
the American Postal Workers Union, and will be an AFL-CIO
affiliate if the Federation's Executive Council approves."" 8
176 GovxrNmNT Eimn'LoYx-s REL. RPT. A-3, A-4 (February 1, 1971).
177 For an outline of this procedure see n.159 supra at § 1207(c) (1), (2).
178 GovERlEvNxur EPLOYEES REL. RPT., A-10 (April 19, 1971).
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The establishment of an independent government postal
agency may tend to lift the postal employees' confidence in their
working future. The structure established lays the basic founda-
tion for the resolution of legitimate grievances through the
process of face to face collective bargaining. It is the utilization
of the well-established process developed in the private enter-
prise area that may enable postal workers to resolve their dif-
ferences with their employers without resorting to the strike
as their only weapon.
Several indicators lead one to believe that there may be an
optimistic future for employee negotiations in the postal service.
The substitution of the National Labor Relations Board as a
neutral third party in the bargaining process may lend the
necessary ingredient that will convince employees that the right
to organize and bargain will be protected so that they may
receive a fair shake. Over time, the management of the postal
service has become increasingly reasonable; and with the transfer
of the bargaining process from its old sphere into a new arena
dominated by a neutral third party, it is likely that any vestiges
of a paternalistic attitude will be completely eroded. Lastly, the
introduction of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
and the utilization of third party arbitration which is mandated
to render a binding decision upon the parties lends every indica-
tion that in the future we shall see a peaceful resolution of labor
management disputes in the postal service.
CONCLUSION
Federal employees have come a long way from their initial
forms of quasi-employee organizations in the 1830's. The Kennedy
and Nixon Executive Orders have shown substantial accomplish-
ments in the improvement of personnel policies. One can no
longer fairly say that federal employees are "second class citizens."
The channels have been opened to enable them to participate
in the formulation and implementation of personnel policies.
Concurrently, the attitudes of government administrators have
evolved from an era of paternalism, which embodied the unilateral
determination of wages, hours and conditions of employment,
into a period wherein there is a mutual determination of some
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of the most important aspects of day-to-day work. The existing
labor relations framework for federal employees gives every
indication of leading to a more efficient government and more
satisfactory working conditions for the individual employee.
Federal employees have come close to achieving the same rights
and privileges accorded to workers in private enterprise.
The two Executive Orders contain substantial protections for
federal employees accompanied by many restraints necessary in
order to meet the exigencies of public employment. Many of
the provisions, as outlined in the foregoing text, seem to appear
to favor unions, while others favor management. It is difficult
at this time to ascertain whether the regulatory process will be
able to fully implement the goals of Executive Order Number
11491.
The government and employees have been given the tools
necessary to construct a workable framework for employee re-
lations in the federal service. With the accumulation of greater
experience on both sides of the bargaining table and the desire
to achieve mutually acceptable goals, both union and manage-
ment may look forward to a period of progress and labor tran-
quality in the years ahead.
